The submarine version's problems are fairly well known (ran low, magnetic exploder (which they were ordered to use) didn't work, impact exploder didn't work). The torpedos used by torpedo bombers faced other problems--propellers that failed, exploders that armed in the air--and it was hard to get the angle of attack into the water to go just right. "In the spring of 1942 the best available solution seemed to be biplane extension stabilizers bolted to the torpedo vanes."
The Bureau also experimented with electric torpedos. They made progress after finding a working German model, but it had issues: "hydrogen tended to form within the compartment. After extensive experimentation with various catalysts, the Bureau endorsed the use of coils in the top of the battery compartment to burn off the excess hydrogen. Each day the coils were lighted, air was blown in to support combustion, and the dangerous gas burned off. The expedient worked, but submariners were suspicious of the procedure. On at least one occasion, enough heat was generated to make the Torpex warhead melt and run."
Politics tried to get in the way of procurement (p 125 =#143 in the reader), and the report concludes with a protestation that overall they did a good job on the Mark 14--"Quantity and quality were both admittedly inadequate, and those were deficiencies which could not be corrected quickly enough to avoid the creation of an atmosphere compounded of controvery and recriminations." "During the course of the first year and a half of war, however, almost every one of the plaguing defects was elminated."
Other people had a rather different view of the history of that "first year and a half"--that it was mostly filled with "not listening." The Mark 14 was developed during the Great Depression, and testing focussed on retrieval/reused of the expensive machines. The resulting tests did not address the real problems of the weapon.
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