Studying war and learning?

Commander Salamander wrote about US fixations about how to fight wars; how the idea that "Both graduated pressure and rapid decisive operations promised efficiency in war" had tangled and crippled us both in Vietnam and in the later wars we're fought in. "The conviction that technology offered a panacea not only impeded U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq to begin with but also slowed the ability to adapt once the true nature of those wars became apparent."

I've been somewhat immersed in WWII Pacific history recently, and see parallels with the Japanese decisive naval battle doctrine with which they hoped to beat the USA. One great victory cripples your enemy's fleet and leaves control of the seas to you. That Mahan's theory didn't quite apply in this case (the US could keep building ships even if the Japanese controlled the Pacific), and that technology changes rendered the doctrine much less relevant, didn't seem to ever sink in.

We field amazingly sophisticated technologies--but the weapon count is low. The Houthis have been exercising our ship defenses, forcing us to chew through expensive systems faster than we can replenish, using cheap stuff.

I wonder: What lessons have our war colleges learned from the Houthis, Afghanis, Ukranians and Russians? And what will those lessons translate into? Are procurements driven by projected needs or by politics and "ooh, shiney"?

I'm not looking forward to cartels (and then others) starting to use cheap drones to attack law enforcement and judges in this country. I suspect it won't be too long. Do we have countermeasures planned?